«RECONCILING SEARLE AND DREYFUS Closing the Gap: Phenomenology and Logical Analysis By Sean Dorrance Kelly I I AGREED TO WRITE THIS ARTICLE ON T IS ...»
Again, we must be careful here. It may be, Pascal-like, that the practices will give rise to value-sensitivity. That is an empirical question that is neither here nor there for this discussion.
What is important is that in the absence of value-sensitivity the practices are not themselves sufficient for a society collectively to impose on something the function of being worth a certain amount.
vol.XIII no.2 2005 THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY 24 Sean Dorrance Kelly Hubert Dreyfus, “Starting Points,” interview by Zoë Sachs-Arellano, The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13, no. 1 (Spring 2005): pp. 123–52. All subsequent citations to this interview will be made in-text.
The third-person method of Russell, by contrast, is guaranteed almost by definition to miss the phenomenological facts. As I have already argued, this third-person approach—as good as it may have been for the analysis of definite descriptions and other linguistic phenomena—is not appropriate for the analysis of the content of non-linguistic intentional states.
I have written further about this idea in “Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty” in The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 74–110. The neuroscientific work of Melvyn Goodale and A. David Milner seems to me to buttress the formulation I have outlined here. Their work is summarized in The Visual Brain in Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). I have written about their work in various places, including an unpublished paper called “The Logic of Motor Intentional Activity.”